peopleanalyst

Magazine · long-form

principal-issues.

Long-form on one idea worth defending: behavioral science — the discipline of measuring people and how they change — is the missing methodology for AI, not its casualty. Each essay takes one place the AI field is reinventing something psychometrics or diffusion science already settled, and shows the older answer. Measurement-first, source-anchored, claims defended rather than asserted — and an experiment in bi-directional adaptive learning.

Currently a small set of pieces, growing as the program does. Borrowing infrastructure (and editorial discipline) from Vela's magazine, oriented to a different topic domain.

Read as a set · 8 principles

The Principles — how we think about measuring people, and AI

The handful of essays that articulate our philosophy and how we build — gathered so they don't crowd the magazine. Each also stands alone as a piece of method you can use whether or not you ever work with us.

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Read as a set · 7 pieces · field craft

The ways a dashboard lies — and how to read it honestly

The recurring traps that turn a confident chart into a wrong decision — causation, composition, small samples, survivorship, multiple comparisons. Pure method, free to use. (These also appear in the feed below.)

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Read as a set · 4 pieces · what the tools miss

What the tools miss — performance, one setting at a time

A cited essay per context — engineering, the support floor, the hospital, the school — each leading with what performance actually means there, and what generic, off-the-shelf tools miss. (These also appear in the feed below.)

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AI–human interaction · what's knowable

AI–human interaction · organization measurement & data science

July 27, 2026

Everything Is Already Known, But Almost Nobody Who Needs to Know, Knows It

You are not behind because the answer hasn't been worked out. You're behind because it was worked out by someone whose work you will never read.

Somewhere this quarter a company will redesign how it pays people and do it worse than the field already knows how to do it — and the specific thing it gets wrong was settled decades ago, in material nobody involved has a realistic path to. The obvious diagnosis is wrong: it isn't that nobody knows. Somebody knows, often for thirty years. The problem is you don't know what other people already know. Google collapsed the distance between a question and its answer by light years and left two things unsolved — search requires you to already know the question, and the expensive errors are never the ones you're searching about; and what comes back is a list of documents, pointing at the open web, while the best material sits in books behind publishers and journals behind a dialect. Then AI, which is the real thing and also a new problem: the answer arrives fluent and confident and you cannot determine what it rests on. So you fall back to books and hit arithmetic — one book is one argument, thirty is the field — while the peer-reviewed literature is more rigorous, frequently at odds with the practitioner shelf, and never meets it. Nobody reads thirty books. That is a time budget, not a character flaw. Then: what it actually takes to build the alternative — getting structure out of a book, running it as a process rather than a heroic one-off, the question we asked that was genuinely dumb and what it exposed about the cost of a claim-checking corpus, and why extracting answers to our own questions and citing the author is a different act from putting the books in a model and letting it answer.

Read · by Mike West

People analytics · the job object

people analytics · organization measurement & data science

July 27, 2026

The Title Is Not the Job

Every workforce analysis starts by rebuilding the same missing object — a frame for what a job actually is. None of the rebuilds reconcile, which is why none of the answers do either.

A recruiter, a comp analyst, and a finance director look at the same person in the same seat and each is holding a different job — a title, a survey code, and a level out of a 2019 reorg nobody has explained since. When they disagree about whether the person is paid correctly, the disagreement is upstream of the answer. Ask a company a reasonable question — are we paying engineers competitively? — and watch the first two weeks go not to pay but to the frame: which of these forty-one titles are the same job, is our Senior a level below theirs, what about the three titles negotiated at hire that describe nothing. Every one is a modeling decision made under time pressure by whoever holds the spreadsheet, and none get written down as decisions. They get written down as the data. Call it the rebuild tax: paid on every analysis, invisible on every invoice, compounding because each rebuild becomes the next one's precedent. The frame that fixes it has to be addressable, crosswalked outward, and honest about its modeled layer. And it buys something you cannot get any other way — attach a field's own canon to the same coordinate as the market data and the distance between them is measurable: what the discipline says the role is for, against what the market actually rewards. A generic job site cannot compute that. It only has one of the two descriptions.

Read · by Mike West

Strategy · explaining pay

people analytics · organization measurement & data science

July 21, 2026

The Pay You Can't Explain

Ask to publish the pay data and you get a flinch before you get an argument. That flinch is the most useful diagnostic in compensation — it's an organization telling you its pay cannot currently be explained.

Employers don't withhold pay data out of ideology. They withhold it because they've read the file: two people a level apart because one was hired in a hot quarter, someone whose eleven years of flat percentages compounded into a number nobody would set today, the twelve percent that went to the person who threatened to leave. The goal was never that everyone is paid the same — a distribution flatter than the value being produced is its own error. The goal is that every difference can be explained credibly, reasonably, against criteria tied to profits or job success. Pay becomes unexplainable structurally: opacity removes the feedback loop, so an error at hire compounds through every merit cycle, gets baked into the next range, and leaves the building through surveys built from what employers pay — returning as a benchmark. "We pay market" is the canonical non-explanation; price your architecture at the median and total it, and you'll find you were already differentiating across jobs without choosing where. And if everyone paid market there would be no market. The testable question isn't about the spread: decompose pay variance into what you'd defend publicly, what you wouldn't, and what nothing explains. The third is the number worth knowing. Transparency isn't the lever — it's the exam you pass once the system is right. You cannot disclose your way to a defensible system; you can only defend your way to a disclosable one.

Read · by Mike West

Methodology · pricing without an outcome

people analytics · organization measurement & data science

July 21, 2026

Moneyball Never Made It to Work

Twenty years of enterprise Moneyball has failed at one specific place — and the received diagnosis of where is wrong. It isn't that there's no outcome variable. It's that there's no agreed, consistent one framed in dollars.

Someone in your company has proposed doing Moneyball for the workforce. It fails in the same place every time, and the popular diagnosis — "there's no outcome variable" — is imprecise enough to be useless. The honest version has three conditions, and the third does the damage: no *agreed-upon*, *consistent* outcome variable *framed in dollars*. Runs become wins, and a market bids for wins in currency; organizational performance has proxies in incompatible units. I've proposed a candidate. It isn't proven, and I won't build a pricing model on it until it is. Then the awkward part: baseball's own story doesn't survive scrutiny either — Hakes and Sauer's own follow-up finds the OBP correction gone by 2006, and standardizing the coefficients reverses the ranking entirely. If the cleanest case anyone ever had is this contested, imitation was never the move. What transfers isn't the outcome model; it's the willingness to check a price against the evidence. Rosen showed prices reveal the implicit prices of characteristics; Autor, Levy and Murnane and Deming priced job content against wages for two decades without ever needing a performance outcome. The question worth asking isn't which content produces success. It's whether identical content fetches different prices under different wrappers — arbitrage, not sabermetrics.

Read · by Mike West

Methodology · units & aggregation

people analytics · organization measurement & data science

July 21, 2026

An Occupation Is Not a Job

Forty-one of our jobs stand behind one federal occupation code, from entry level to principal, sharing one median. Occupation-level data answers occupation-level questions — and we keep asking it job-level ones.

Someone in your company priced a job last month by looking up a code. For a lot of readers here it was 13-1071, Human Resources Specialists, median $72,910 — and standing in that row, in our own canon, are forty-one distinct jobs: HR business partner, generalist, transformation, people operations, talent acquisition, global mobility, people analytics, P1 through P6. The classification isn't broken; its own definition says an occupation is a *group of jobs*, and it was built for counting, not deciding. Robinson settled the general case in 1950: aggregate the same census data and the nativity-illiteracy correlation flips from +.118 to −.526, and the coarser the grouping the stronger the false finding looks. Measured across our canon, 956 jobs collapse onto 84 occupations — mean 11.4, worst case 49 — and the number they collapse into was already a 2-to-1 wage band before anything was collapsed. Reliability can't catch it, because every rater sees the same over-collapsed unit. The fix is a change of unit: the job is the identity, the occupation is one pooled source of evidence, and the pooling ratio travels as a confidence input. A measure that cannot disagree with you is not evidence.

Read · by Mike West

Methodology · regression to the mean

people analytics · organization measurement & data science · AI–human interaction

June 28, 2026

The Turnaround That Wasn't

Pull the lowest-scoring teams, run a program, and watch their scores jump — the biggest gains in the company. The jump is mostly regression to the mean: a group selected for being at the bottom climbs back toward the middle whether or not you did anything. Without a control, the slide can't tell.

Twenty bottom-decile managers go through a development program and post the largest year-over-year engagement gains anywhere; the offsite calls it a win and scales it. But they were chosen for scoring at the bottom, and a group chosen for an extreme drifts back toward the mean on re-measure regardless — because part of any extreme score is transient noise that doesn't repeat. Galton named the effect in 1886; Kahneman's flight instructors misread it as praise hurting and rebuke helping. The honest design builds the one comparison that sees through it: randomize within the bottom decile, or run difference-in-differences against equally-low teams that got nothing — the regression hits both, so the gap left is your effect. It costs you the clean two-bar slide and answers the only question that matters: did we cause the improvement, or schedule a measurement at the bottom of a bounce? Getting easier to miss as targeting automates — a model flags the high-risk, the scores subside, and the dashboard takes the credit. Before you scale the turnaround: did we pick these units for being extreme on the same measure we now use to score them, and was there a group just as bad that got nothing?

Read · by Mike West